Test detail

I have gathered sufficient information, so I will provide a systematic response.

Why the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement Is Not Amended: "Cannot" or "Does Not"?

■ Conclusion First

It is more accurate to say "does not/has not" rather than "cannot." However, behind this lie multiple structural factors, and it cannot be simply characterized as "intentional neglect." Below is a detailed explanation.

■ What is the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement?

The Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement, based on Article 6 of the new Japan-US Security Treaty, was signed on January 19, 1960, between Japan and the United States. It defines the status of the US military stationed in Japan. Notably, it is not reciprocal but defines only the status of US forces.

Despite major changes in social conditions, public consciousness, and legal awareness since 1960 when the agreement took effect, over 60 years have passed without a single amendment.

■ Critical Differences Between Germany, Italy, and Japan

[1] Differences in Institutional Framework (The Existence of NATO)

The agreements governing US forces stationed in Germany and Italy are based on NATO Status of Forces Agreements. Germany concluded the "Bonn Supplementary Agreement" (1959), and Italy concluded the "Bilateral Base Facilities Agreement" (1954) and "Model Practical Arrangements" (1995), which effectively play roles similar to the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement.

Former Foreign Minister Kono Taro stated: "It is natural that status of forces agreements differ between NATO member states bearing mutual defense obligations and Japan, which bears different obligations."

In other words, Germany and Italy, as NATO members, bear mutual defense obligations nearly equal to the US, which underpins their negotiating power. According to Japan's official government position, Japan lacks this backing.

[2] Germany and Italy Have Actually Amended Multiple Times

Unlike the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement, which has never reviewed its main text, Germany's Bonn Supplementary Agreement has undergone three amendments since its conclusion. Notably, the 1993 amendment required German approval for troop training and explicitly stated the application of domestic law. A new environmental protection clause was also added. "Japan could strengthen domestic law application and enhance sovereignty."

In peacetime, Germany's agreement requires German approval or authorization for US military training, and Italy similarly requires notification and approval from Italian commanders. Additionally, following US military accidents, German and Italian forces gained the ability to conduct primary investigations. These were results of amendments.

The 1988 German air show crash accident is said to have driven heightened public demand for supplementary agreement revisions.

[3] Operational Differences from Japan

Unlike Germany and Italy, Japan makes no distinction between peacetime and wartime, allowing training assuming wartime conditions at all times. Consequently, nighttime combat aircraft takeoffs and landings assuming wartime conditions remain possible.

Under Germany's Bonn Supplementary Agreement, German police retain the right to enter provided facilities and areas. Italy's agreement explicitly grants Italian military commanders authority to enter all areas and facilities within bases "as guardians of national sovereignty."

■ Why Japan "Does Not": Structural Reasons

Reason 1: "Dependence" on the Japan-US Security Treaty and Lack of Negotiating Power

Japan has not demanded amendment because there is concern that if it insists on operational restrictions unfavorable to US forces, they might withdraw from Japan. The "if US forces remain, the nation's security is assured" safety-first attitude influenced by dependence on the Japan-US Security Treaty manifests in this form. While the Japan-US Security Treaty is undoubtedly important for security, maintaining it should not be synonymous with leaving the Status of Forces Agreement and agreed minutes unchanged.

Reason 2: The "Agreed Minutes" Structure as a Secret Pact

The Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement has not undergone democratic procedures and its operations are determined without Diet discussion. Originally, amending the Japan-US Administrative Agreement aimed to eliminate the special privileges of US forces during the occupation period. Yet in reality, these privileges are maintained through agreed minutes, undermining the amendment's purpose—a significant problem.

Reason 3: Lack of Political Will

"It is actually America expressing concerns about the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement" "Since Japan is not currently at war, its degree of sovereignty should be extremely high. Yet compared to what Afghanistan and Iraq have surrendered to the US military, what Japan has surrendered resembles privileges akin to colonialism." (Analysis by conflict resolution specialist Kenji Isezaki)

During last year's Liberal Democratic Party presidential election, Shigeru Ishiba exceptionally included "Status of Forces Agreement revision" in his platform, briefly drawing major attention. It was unprecedented for a prominent LDP politician to directly address this issue, and expectations were high among voters in prefectures troubled by base issues. However, Ishiba subsequently resigned without demonstrating concrete results, once again highlighting the difficulty of this theme and the limitations of the ruling party.

Reason 4: Other Countries Achieved Amendments Through "Negotiation"

Retired NATO Fifth Tactical Air Force Commander Toricarico of Italy stated: "It is important to make the US side recognize Japan's sovereignty" and "It is essential to make the US side aware through every opportunity that they are invited guests and to have them respect Japanese culture and values."

In South Korea, national sentiment in 2001 drove major amendments to the status of forces agreement. For specific serious crimes like murder and rape, South Korean police gained the legal right to detain suspects even before prosecution by South Korea—a significant difference from Japan's reliance on American "goodwill."

■ Summary: "Cannot" or "Does Not"?

Germany and Italy have persistently negotiated, leveraging incidents and public pressure, recovering sovereignty. That Japan has not reflects not an inability but a political choice prioritizing "security reliance on US forces." Amendment is not "impossible" but rather "Japan has not possessed the will to do so." This is the most accurate answer.

Regarding the amendment of the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement, whether Japan "cannot" or "does not," several factors are at play.

1. Diplomatic Factors: Japan prioritizes maintaining strong alliance relations with the US, and there are views that it has become cautious about amendment due to concerns that negotiations could become difficult.

2. Security Considerations: US military presence in Japan is considered important for Japan's security, and there is an apparent intention to maintain the status quo to ensure stability.

3. Political Elements: Opinions within Japan on this issue diverge, and the political risks involved mean that proceeding with amendment is not straightforward.

4. Difference in Negotiating Power: In negotiations with the US, Japan may feel it cannot always proceed on equal terms.

These factors partly reflect Japan's independent decision to "does not" amend, but Japan is also being pushed into a "cannot" situation by external factors. Additionally, while the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement has undergone partial operational changes and reviews, full-scale amendment has not been achieved to date.

The Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement, first concluded on January 19, 1960, has not undergone fundamental revision since then. During this period, numerous incidents and accidents involving US military forces, noise damage, and environmental problems have occurred, with repeated calls for amendment to the agreement. However, the Japanese government has responded only with "operational improvements" and the conclusion of "supplementary agreements."

Meanwhile, Germany and Italy have amended their status of forces agreements with the United States.

• Germany: The Supplementary Agreement to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement in Germany (Bonn Supplementary Agreement), concluded in 1959, underwent major revisions in 1971, 1981, and especially in 1993. The amended agreement explicitly states the application of German domestic law to stationed forces, requires German permission, approval, and consent for training and exercises. It also clearly specifies German authorities' right to enter bases.
• Italy: Italy's Status of Forces Agreement has also been modified. For example, following the 1998 US military aircraft crash, regulations were strengthened. Italy's agreement mandates Italian government (military) approval for US military training and exercises, with all US forces placed under Italian military command. Significant operations, exercises, and accident occurrences must be reported to the Italian side, and low-altitude flights by US aircraft are effectively prohibited.

The reasons why Japan cannot or does not amend the agreement like Germany and Italy are pointed out as follows:

• Differences in principles regarding domestic law application: The Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement reflects the Japanese government's position that, in principle, Japanese law does not apply to US forces stationed in Japan, contrary to international law principles of territorial sovereignty. In contrast, Germany and Italy apply domestic law to stationed US forces in peacetime as a general principle.
• Response through "operational improvements": The Japanese government has addressed issues not through revising the agreement text but through agreements at the Japan-US Joint Committee via "operational improvements" and through "international commitments" bypassing Diet deliberation via supplementary agreements. These approaches have not led to fundamental resolution, drawing criticism.
• Connection to the Japan-US Security Treaty: The Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement, based on the Japan-US Security Treaty, defines the rights of US military presence in Japan. Underlying this is recognition of the necessity of US military presence for Japan's postwar security structure. Some argue the Japanese government becomes cautious about status of forces agreement revision due to its emphasis on the security treaty.
• Negotiation approach: It is pointed out that the Japanese government lacks a sincere and serious approach to US negotiation demanding fundamental amendment. Some analyses suggest that because many Japanese citizens have long believed peace is maintained through US protection, they have accepted unequal agreements as inevitable.
• Non-transparency of the Japan-US Joint Committee: Since negotiation records of the Japan-US Joint Committee, where operational matters of the status of forces agreement are discussed, are principally non-public, this lack of transparency in decision-making processes is problematic and hinders nationwide debate toward amendment.

Based on these reasons, the answer to whether Japan "cannot" or "does not" amend appears to be that the Japanese government's historical response represents a strong "does not" (i.e., not pursuing fundamental amendment). Despite repeated calls from public opinion and local governments for fundamental amendment, the Japanese government's continuation of "operational improvements" alone, without actively pursuing negotiation with the United States, is identified as the primary cause preventing change.

The Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement, formally titled "Agreement between Japan and the United States of America Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan" based on Article 6 of the Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty between Japan and the United States, has not undergone formal amendment to its text since its conclusion in 1960. While operational improvements, supplementary agreements, and interpretive adjustments have been repeated, the core sections have not been amended.

In contrast, Germany and Italy have amended their respective agreements:

• Germany: Based on the 1951 NATO Status of Forces Agreement and the 1959 Supplementary Agreement, a 1971 revision example exists.
• Italy: In addition to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, the 1954 bilateral infrastructure agreement was updated in 1973, and operational updates/reorganization through arrangements like the 1995 Shell Agreement have occurred.

NATO member states have a structure making updates to supplementary agreements relatively flexible within a multilateral framework. Conversely, in the Japan-US case, the Security Treaty and Status of Forces Agreement are closely linked, and the agreement functions strongly as a "troop stationing agreement" defining US military presence rights and privileges, creating higher barriers to amendment.

Whether Japan "Cannot" or "Does Not" Amend

Legally, there is no "cannot" reason. Treaties can be amended by mutual agreement of both parties, and the US has no legal basis to refuse amendment. Precedent exists of partial amendment during the Administrative Agreement era (1953). However, in practice, the Japanese government has continued choosing "does not" (or does not actively pursue) amendment. Primary reasons include:

• Asymmetry in the Alliance Structure: The Japan-US Security Treaty is "one-sided" with defense obligations heavily tilted toward the US. Demanding vigorous Status of Forces Agreement amendment risks the US raising demands for increased mutual defense obligations or reviewing base usage (withdrawal risk). Japan has historically depended on US military presence for security under Article 9 of the Constitution, and avoids revision risking overall alliance destabilization.
• US Negotiating Superiority: US State Department reports indicate that countries "needing" overseas presence face US superiority in status of forces agreement negotiations. With majority Japanese public support for the security treaty, the Japanese government has consistently pursued operational improvements over amendment.
• Impact on Other Countries and Complexity: Amendment could affect all provisions with involvement of all relevant ministries and attorneys, potentially becoming large-scale negotiation. Concerns also exist regarding alignment with NATO member status of forces agreements and risks of further US demands for concessions.
• Official Government Position: Even following incidents and accidents, the government maintains the stance that "individual case-by-case operational improvement suffices" and "amendment unnecessary," addressing issues through supplementary agreements and Joint Committee coordination (2024-2026 similarly).

While repeated amendment requests come from Okinawa Prefecture, base host municipalities, opposition parties, and scholars (涉外 governors' association petitioned again in 2026), successive administrations have prioritized "current framework maintenance" over "base reduction/removal" or "security treaty termination," reflecting historical background.

In essence, there are no "cannot" legal or structural constraints, but a "does not" choice continues through strategic and political judgment. Where Germany and Italy leveraged NATO's multilateral and supplementary agreement flexibility, Japan faces primarily the asymmetry of bilateral alliance and domestic security dependence as barriers. Amendment depends on political will and negotiation from both Japan and the US, and is not absolutely "impossible."