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Reasons for Extremely Delayed Reconstruction from the Noto Earthquake

The 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake (the Reiwa 6 Noto Peninsula Earthquake) occurred on January 1, 2024, with a maximum seismic intensity of 7. It caused catastrophic damage to areas including Wajima City and Suzu City, resulting in collapsed houses, severed roads, and stopped lifelines that severely undermined residents' living foundations. The reconstruction from this earthquake has been notably slower compared to other major earthquakes due to multiple overlapping complex factors.

① Geographic and Topographic Disadvantages of a Peninsula

The Noto Peninsula is a region with limited transportation access. From immediately after the earthquake, there were visible signs that material transportation and support activities were not proceeding smoothly. The severance of major roads made it difficult to transport heavy machinery and materials necessary for repair work, which became a factor preventing reconstruction progress.

From affected areas such as Suzu City and Wajima City to the nearby major city of Kanazawa is approximately 150 km, and to Toyama City approximately 140 km. Even to the nearby mid-sized city of Nanao, it is approximately 90 km away. The region is experiencing depopulation and aging, making it time-consuming to establish a large-scale support system.

Compared to the Kumamoto earthquake, while the concentrated damage area in Kumamoto was 2 km east-west by 1 km north-south, in the Noto Peninsula it is scattered over a wide area, making the efficiency of repair operations significantly different.

② Severe Aging and Depopulation

The aging rates in severely affected municipalities in Oku-Noto are: Suzu City 51.7%, Noto Town 50.4%, Anamizu Town 49.5%, and Wajima City 46.3%. These far exceed the national average of 28.8% (as of 2020).

Since the Noto Peninsula had already been experiencing population decline and aging before the earthquake, the shortage of young workers has become an obstacle to reconstruction. There is insufficient labor to repair damaged houses and develop infrastructure, necessitating reliance on external support.

③ Overwhelming Shortage of Construction Companies and Technicians

It was found that among the disaster recovery construction projects bid by the four municipalities in Oku-Noto, Ishikawa Prefecture, 25% had failed bidding processes. The background includes a shortage of technicians in construction companies, with some cases showing zero bids. For example, in the reconstruction of a certain childcare facility, even after four rounds of bidding from November of the previous year, no construction company was selected, making the timeline for facility reopening unclear.

Experts familiar with the construction industry point out that "while office workers and site supervisors are increasing nationwide, technicians who operate heavy machinery and skilled workers are decreasing." With material prices rising, contractors also cannot undertake projects with deficits risks.

④ Shortage of Municipal Staff and Limitations of Administrative Capacity

Against the backdrop of labor shortages, publicly-funded demolition and repair work have become difficult, and there is also insufficient staff to devote to reconstruction planning.

Japan's disaster recovery and reconstruction system presupposes an administrative procedure process where impact assessment determines the extent of damage, emergency recovery provides minimum functionality restoration, reconstruction plans are formulated, cost assessments and budgets are secured, and then projects are contracted and executed. However, in Noto, due to delays in initial surveys caused by road severance, plus shortages and price increases of equipment and materials, and a lack of technical administrative staff and local construction companies, it is recognized that this process has not functioned adequately.

⑤ Significant Delays in Publicly-Funded Demolition

Publicly-funded demolition and removal of completely destroyed houses by local governments had only advanced to 25% of the total by the end of 2024. This lags far behind other earthquakes. As a result, residents remained in a state where they could not move forward with home reconstruction for an extended period.

⑥ September 2024 "Oku-Noto Heavy Rainfall" as a Compound Disaster

Record-breaking heavy rainfall (Oku-Noto Heavy Rainfall) that occurred September 21-23, 2024, dealt a further blow to earthquake reconstruction.

As the Noto Peninsula approached one year since the earthquake, the September heavy rainfall disaster compounded difficulties, leaving residents facing unprecedentedly harsh conditions heading into winter. With roads in mid-recovery and numerous sections still severed, house demolition from the earthquake and infrastructure recovery remained untouched in many areas, with concerns about secondary disasters from heavy snow.

Suzu City had planned to finalize its reconstruction plan by the end of 2024, but the September heavy rainfall disaster caused delays to the schedule.

⑦ Inadequate Environment for Accepting Volunteers and Support

While labor shortage is the greatest bottleneck in recovery, Oku-Noto lacks sufficient accommodation facilities, and a situation relying on "volunteers" and "private sector" alone is unavoidable decline.

Summary

The factors delaying Noto's reconstruction are not a single issue but rather interconnected structural problems: "remote peninsula topography," "extreme aging and depopulation," "labor shortage of construction companies and administrative staff," "difficulties in publicly-funded demolition," and "compound disasters from heavy rainfall." The delayed recovery and reconstruction of the Noto Peninsula cannot be explained solely by physical characteristics such as peninsula topography, severed roads, scattered settlements, and compound disasters from heavy rainfall. Rather, it represents a complex challenge and can be said to be a case exposing the limitations of Japan's disaster response systems themselves.

Regarding publicly-funded demolition, while the number of buildings was approximately doubled compared to initial projections, by the end of October 2025 it reached 95%, and by the end of November reached 97.9%. Considering geographical conditions and the two heavy rainfall disasters, this can be evaluated as remarkable progress. Currently, the phase is shifting from publicly-funded demolition to housing reconstruction and industrial revitalization.

Regarding why reconstruction from the Noto earthquake has been extremely delayed, I do not have specific information. However, the following can be considered as general factors:

1. Insufficient Funding: Reconstruction requires substantial expenses, and if government and municipal budgets are insufficient, progress may be delayed.

2. Infrastructure Damage: When infrastructure is extensively damaged by earthquakes, repairs can take considerable time.

3. Population Decline and Aging: In reconstruction areas experiencing population decline or aging, labor shortages and insufficient local support may occur.

4. Administrative Procedures: Complex procedures such as plan formulation and permit acquisition may slow project progress.

5. Natural Environment and Topographic Difficulty: When earthquakes alter terrain or create transportation difficulties, reconstruction work itself becomes harder.

6. Complex Coordination Work: When coordination among local residents and related organizations becomes difficult, projects may be delayed.

To verify the current situation, consulting local news and official announcements would be appropriate.

The extremely delayed reconstruction from the Noto earthquake is thought to result from multiple complex factors intertwining together. The main reasons are as follows:

1. Geographic Factors and Fragile Transportation Infrastructure The Noto Peninsula is geographically isolated, and immediately after the earthquake, major roads were severed, disrupting material transportation and support activities. The difficulty in transporting heavy machinery and materials necessary for repair work significantly affected reconstruction delays. In particular, Suzu City and Wajima City, located at the peninsula's tip, are far from major cities, making it difficult to receive support from administrative services and medical facilities. The occurrence of numerous road collapses and landslides caused serious damage, along with liquefaction causing road undulations and cracks.

2. Population Structure (Depopulation and Aging) and Weakening of Regional Communities The Noto region was already experiencing depopulation and aging before the earthquake, which became further evident through the disaster. Many elderly residents struggled with home reconstruction due to age, and faced difficulties maintaining communities and rebuilding lives. The situation where residents who once left the region were reluctant to return also became a factor delaying reconstruction.

3. Weakened Local Government and Insufficient Disaster Assumptions Through events like the "Heisei Great Merger," administrative staff in Oku-Noto municipalities were significantly reduced, and the administrative capacity to understand local situations and implement rapid recovery and reconstruction plans weakened. Additionally, Ishikawa Prefecture's damage estimates falling far short of actual damage led to delays in initial response and inadequacies in reconstruction plans.

4. Delayed Housing Earthquake Resistance and Extensive Housing Damage In the Noto Peninsula earthquake, collapses of old wooden buildings were prominent, with over 80% of direct deaths caused by building collapses. This resulted largely from delayed housing earthquake-proofing. With over 160,000 housing units damaged, publicly-funded demolition and securing permanent housing became major challenges.

5. Lifeline Disruptions and Prolonged Recovery Beyond earthquake shaking, secondary disasters including fires occurred, and recovery of electricity, water, and gas lifelines required extended time. Combined with transportation network severance, many households endured prolonged evacuation shelter living, complicating life reconstruction.

6. Issues in Recovery and Reconstruction Processes with Material and Personnel Shortages Japan's disaster recovery and reconstruction system presumes step-by-step administrative procedures. In Noto, however, initial survey delays from road severance, combined with material shortages and price increases, and insufficient technical administrative staff and local construction companies, prevented this process from functioning adequately. Repeated bidding failures show construction capacity shortages as another factor obstructing reconstruction.

7. Compound Disaster Risks After the Noto Peninsula earthquake, heavy rainfall disasters also occurred, further accelerating repair work delays.

These overlapping factors place Noto earthquake reconstruction in particularly difficult circumstances compared to other major disasters. Reconstruction is transitioning toward a stage of recovering "vitality," but many challenges remain, including resident returns and tourism industry revitalization.

The Noto Peninsula earthquake (occurring January 1, 2024) reconstruction delays result from the complex intertwining of geographic and physical factors, shortages of personnel, materials, and administrative capacity, compound disasters, structural challenges from aging and depopulation, and procedural complexity. From approximately 2.5 years after the earthquake as of 2026, permanent housing reconstruction and full-scale infrastructure recovery remain particularly delayed in Oku-Noto (northern areas including Wajima and Suzu cities), with noted "north-south disparity." [[1]](https://www.sankei.com/article/20250611-KK6XD5BBUBPEJDPNUMVXXAKCJE/)[[2]](https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOCC176RQ0X10C26A7000000/)

Below are the main reasons organized (based on Japan Society of Civil Engineers commentary, media reports, and official/expert analysis):

1. Geographic and Physical Factors, Access Difficulty, and Logistics Challenges

• The narrow peninsula topography, mountainous terrain, and scattered settlements meant road severance significantly delayed initial surveys, rescue efforts, and material transportation. Access to the peninsula tip (Oku-Noto) is particularly poor, making procurement of workers, heavy machinery, and materials prone to disruption.
• Post-earthquake uplift, liquefaction, and lateral spread caused significant ground deformation, requiring time-consuming surveying, boundary confirmation, and infrastructure recovery.
• This created bottlenecks throughout the entire recovery process. [[3]](https://committees.jsce.or.jp/editorial/system/files/no230_simada.pdf)[[4]](https://www.scj.go.jp/ja/info/kohyo/pdf2/kohyo-26-k251127.pdf)

2. Labor and Material Shortages with Price Inflation

• Shortage of local construction contractors (already limited due to depopulation) is severe, with repeated bidding failures (unresponsive or excessively high bids). Conventional cost estimates no longer hold, making schedule delays routine.
• Equipment and material shortages and inflation (construction costs in some cases rose 2-3 times pre-disaster levels) disrupt procurement.
• Workers typically commute from distant areas like Kanazawa, reducing efficiency. Technical administrative staff shortages also delay administrative processes including order placement, oversight, and inspection. [[3]](https://committees.jsce.or.jp/editorial/system/files/no230_simada.pdf)[[5]](https://www.moneypost.jp/1235508)

3. Weakened Administrative Capacity of Local Governments

• The "Heisei Great Merger" and similar consolidations reduced staff numbers, particularly technical specialists. Affected municipalities (Oku-Noto cities and towns) have limited response capacity, making critical administrative reconstruction processes less smooth.
• Pre-disaster damage estimates being substantially understated (actual damage far exceeded projections) resulted in insufficient plan revisions, delaying initial response and reconstruction. [[6]](https://www.min-iren.gr.jp/news-press/shinbun/20241203_51767.html)

4. Compound Disaster Effects

• September 2024 Oku-Noto heavy rainfall caused re-damage, with emergency repair sites sustaining injury. Limited personnel became occupied with rework, creating a vicious cycle.
• This further delayed overall infrastructure recovery and housing reconstruction. [[3]](https://committees.jsce.or.jp/editorial/system/files/no230_simada.pdf)[[1]](https://www.sankei.com/article/20250611-KK6XD5BBUBPEJDPNUMVXXAKCJE/)

5. Acceleration of Aging and Depopulation with Population Loss

• The affected area has extremely high aging rates (some regions with 65+ exceeding 50%), making independent reconstruction difficult. Loan acquisition and construction contract placement are problematic, with population outflow (particularly young families) accelerating.
• Reports indicate Oku-Noto's four municipalities experienced 7.5-13% population decline post-earthquake, worsening reconstruction personnel shortages. [[5]](https://www.moneypost.jp/1235508)[[7]](https://grokipedia.com/page/2024_noto_earthquake)

6. Procedural and Institutional Hurdles

• Delayed publicly-funded demolition resulted from unsettled inheritance registrations (multiple ancestral rights holders), making consent acquisition difficult.
• Land boundary confirmation, liquefaction countermeasures, and disaster public housing development (with multi-year timelines from land acquisition to construction to occupancy) all require extended periods.
• System rigidity and information-sharing inadequacies are also noted. [[5]](https://www.moneypost.jp/1235508)[[8]](https://senshu-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/2001739/files/5031_0033_05.pdf)

Supplement: Progress Status and Regional Differences

Temporary housing is nearly complete with some infrastructure and port cargo showing recovery trends, but permanent housing (particularly independent reconstruction and disaster public housing) progress lags, with most disaster victims reporting "life has not returned to normal." North (Oku-Noto) shows particular delays while south areas and some tourist facilities show progress—notable regional disparity exists. [[2]](https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOCC176RQ0X10C26A7000000/)[[9]](https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/backstories/4508/)

These reflect regional characteristics where prerequisites (administrative and construction capacity) difficult to meet compared to past disasters (Kumamoto earthquake, etc.). National, prefectural, and municipal governments are advancing countermeasures, but "creative reconstruction" linked with fundamental depopulation and aging countermeasures is required. Please verify detailed information with the latest official sources and on-site investigations.